Is Quran the Word of Prophet Muhammad?

Modernists' Views

There has been a tendency among several contemporary Muslim scholars to conceive of a human aspect with regards to Qur’anic revelation by emphasizing the part played by the person of the Prophet in receiving it. These are modernists some of whom have also emphasized the need to apply historical, philological, and literary methods to the text of the Qur’an. For instance, Fazlur Rahman contends that, “The Qur’an is thus pure Divine Word, but, of course, it is equally intimately related to the inmost personality of the Prophet Muhammad whose relationship to it cannot be mechanically conceived like that of a record. The Divine Word flowed through the Prophet’s heart.”

Rahman, furthermore, distinguishes between the moral regulations of the Qur’an and the legal regulations. To him, “The moral law is immutable: it is God’s “Command”, Man cannot make or unmake the Moral Law: he must submit himself to it...” Legal regulations, on the other hand, are contingent. Quoting the Qur’anic injunctions regarding polygamy and the institution of slavery as examples, Rahman concludes: “These examples, therefore, make it abundantly clear that whereas the spirit of the qur’anic legislation exhibits an obvious direction towards the progressive embodiment of the fundamental human values of freedom and responsibility in fresh legislation, nevertheless the actual legislation of the Qur’an had partly to accept the then existing society as a term of reference. This clearly means that the actual legislation of the Qur’an cannot have been meant to be literally eternal by the Qur’an itself. This fact has no reference to the doctrine of the eternity of the Qur’an or to the allied doctrine of the verbal revelation of the Qur’an.”

Polygamy and Slavery

Rahman forgets that the institutions of polygamy and slavery were not original to the Qur’an. Polygamy existed centuries before the revelation of the Qur’an. As a guidance to mankind, the Qur’an had to address these issues. The Qur’an’s condoning of polygamy was not as a piece of pure male chauvinism. It was meant to be a piece of social legislation. The Qur’an merely regularized the then unlimited choice (spousal number) of men to four wives, connecting this choice closely to the then pressing practical problem of the Muslim community namely, the heavy losses incurred at the battle of Uhud and the resulting surplus number of orphans. The Qur’an also connected this social responsibility with the stern condition of absolute justice, “But if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one or which your right hands possess” (4:3). It also warned men from the outset that, “Ye are never able to do justice between wives even if it is your ardent desire...” (4:129). Therefore, it can be argued, that there is nothing in the Qur’anic understanding of the institution of polygamy that is specific or related only to the society of seventh century Arabia. Polygamy, for the Qur’an, is not a privilege; it is a social responsibility. In the presence of pressing situations and circumstances such as those prevailing in Madinah after the battle of Uhud, the Qur’anic institution of polygamy with its qualifying principles, may serve as an alternative, better than promiscuity or serial polygamy, even in current times.

Similarly, the institution of slavery was an ancientcustom, not only a feature of Arabian society at the time, but also intrinsic to most societies of the day. Unlike prevailing practice however, the Qur’an condoned neither maltreatment of slaves, nor the institution of slavery to a great extent. Rather, the Qur’an took practical and revolutionary steps to gradually eliminate the vast gulf that lay between slaves and their masters: (a) the Qur’an legislated for the freeing of slaves (al-¢Itq) as atonement for many intentional and non-intentional religious violations (4:92; 5:89; 58:3), (b) it promised great rewards for the freeing of slaves or the buying of their freedom (90:13), (c) it frequently emphasized the absolute equality and brotherhood of slaves and masters calling for mutual respect (49:13), (d) it encouraged masters to marry or free slave-girls, (e) it promulgated the institution of mukatabah i.e., allowing a slave to purchase his/her freedom in installments paid over a period of time (24:33), (f) it assigned a special portion of zakah for the freeing of slaves and other related areas such as helping a mukatab etc. (9:60) etc. The latter are just a few of the ways by which the Qur’an dealt with the issue of slavery and its dilution as a force in society, eliminating its ancient hold. Moreover, the stern attitude of the Prophet regarding the rights, equality, and respect of slaves as brothers in humanity and faith, worked as an additional element factor enforcing the Qur’anic spirit of equality and kindness towards them. Islam could not have unilaterally abolished slavery so long as the world did not agree to put an end to one of its primary sources, war, through enslave- ment of prisoners-of-war. But when the anti-slavery concord was reached by the international community, Islam welcomed it.

Such a sharp difference of focus and perspective on the part of the Qur’an regarding the issues of polygamy and slavery, alone refutes Rahman’s claims that the Qur’an accepted the then existing society as a point of reference. Rather, it is the other way around. Moreover, such a legislation of the Qur’an cannot be interpreted as temporal or connected with a specific society or region. The existence and public practice of the institution of slavery until our modern times, nullifies such a supposition. Therefore, these examples do not prove the point Rahman has raised i.e., that the Qur’anic legal regulations are contingent. In addition, mainstream Islam has always accepted all Qur’anic regulations as eternal and authoritative. What the bases for Rahman’s differentiation between the moral and legal legislations of the Qur’an are, is unknown.

Rahman however only goes so far, and interpretations and views such as his have been taken to astonishing extremes by others. To Rippin, for instance, these interpretations of Rahman mean that the Qur’an is not “revealed literally but... installed in Muhammad’s heart and then spoken through the human faculties of the prophet. The language, therefore, is Muhammad’s, although it is still possible to hold that this is ultimately God’s word also.”

Rahman has made it very clear through his works that the words of the Revelation were also from God, arguing that, “Whatever the agency of Revelation, however, the true revealing subject always remains God, for it is He Who always speaks in the first person...” He further observes, the fact that “the Prophet actually mentally “heard” words is clear from 75:16– 19: “Do not hasten your tongue with it [the Revelation] in order to anticipate it. It is our task to collect it and recite it. So when we recite it, follow its recital, and then it is also our task to explain it” (see also 20:114). It is also clear that, in his anxiety to retain it or to “anticipate” it in a direction different from that of his Revealing Spirit, the Prophet moved his tongue of his own ordinary human volition, the intrusion of which was repudiated by God. This necessarily implies the total “otherness” of the agent of Revelation from the conscious personality of Muhammad in the act of Revelation.”

We may possibly interpret Rahman’s views as more fully related to the interpretations given to the Qur’anic text over the centuries by Muslim orthodoxy, rather than with the Qur’anic text itself. I would probably  have  the  same  observations  about  Rahman  as  Ian  Richard Netton  (b.  1948),  Head  of  the  Department  of  Arabic  and  Middle Eastern Studies, University of Leeds, did with regards to the blind Syrian poet,  Abu  al-¢Ala’  al-Ma¢arri  (973–1057),  whose  Risalat al-Ghufran (The  Epistle  of  Pardon)  and  “skeptical  attitudes  towards  religion aroused considerable suspicions.” Netton observed that al-Ma’arri, “was probably not anti-religion per se but against its organization and ritualized aspects. He sought truth but objected strongly to the truth being encapsulated in rigid formulae.” Likewise, Rahman seems to be critical of so-called orthodoxy and its claims to sole authority in interpreting the Qur’an. To Rahman, the text of the Qur’an is the word of God and normative; however, he seems somewhat dissatisfied with the method by which this text has been understood by some Muslims in the past. Like other neo-modernists (i.e. Muhammad Ahmad Khalaf Allah, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Mohammad Arkoun, to name a few), Rahman seems to be looking for such interpretations of the Qur’anic text that, to him, are appropriate or essential in connection with the developing circumstances of modern-day life. He wants to do this without denying the divine origin of the Qur’an. Therefore, neo- modernists like Rahman cannot be quoted as an example within Islam of the trend common to modern biblical scholars of viewing scriptures as the word of God mixed with the word of man or emphasizing the human aspect in revelation. The Qur’an, to all Muslims without exception, is the word of God. In contrast, the firm Muslim belief in the divine composition of the Qur’an is a factor/stance persistently denied by western writers down the years. The overwhelming majority of these have categorically rejected the claims of the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, as well as Muslims of all ages and times, that God Almighty Himself directly revealed the text of the Qur’an to Muhammad and that Muhammad’s sole function was to receive and convey the Qur’an to mankind with absolute sincerity and precision. A great majority of western scholars claim that the Qur’an was composed by Muhammad, with or without the help of others. For instance, Sale asserts, “That Muhammad was really the author and chief contriver of the Qur’an is beyond dispute; though it be highly probable that he had no small assistance in his design from others.” Sir William Muir in the 19th century, Wollaston in 1905, Menezes in 1911, Draycott in 1916, Lammens in 1926, Champion and Short in 1959, Glubb in 1970, and Rodinson as late as 1977, advocated the same view, with Menezes writing that the Qur’an is “nothing else but a pure creation and concoction of Mohammed and of his accomplice.”

Muslim scholars on the other hand analyze linguistic and stylistic differences between the Qur’an and hadith to highlight the Qur’an’s divine origins. They also contend that the depth, variety and infinite range of the Qur’anic ideas were beyond Muhammad’s mortal mind. They quote many Qur’anic verses bearing true and exact scientific information to argue that the subject matter of these verses was far beyond Muhammad’s finite knowledge and mortal creative imagina- tion. Maurice Bucaille, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Abd al-Majid A. al-Zindani, and many other Muslim writers have taken this route to argue for the divine origin and composition of the Qur’an; the intention being to prove the absolute divine nature of the Qur’an from the scientific data available within it.

In summary, the dialogue around the human aspect in Qur'anic revelation, as posited by modernist scholars like Rahman, represents a nuanced understanding of the text that respects its divine origin while also considering its historical and societal context. This approach seeks to reconcile traditional interpretations with contemporary challenges, underscoring the dynamic and evolving nature of Islamic scholarship.